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ABSTRACT 
The thesis has five chapters: (1) an introduction, (2) the economic risk factors causing 
civil conflicts, (3) the economic dimensions of peace-building (4) a Kosovo case study, 
and (5) the conclusion. 
Chapter II discusses the economic risk factors that cause civil conflicts. Specific 
economic characteristics, such as the availability of natural resources, enduring economic 
decline (with its effects of low incomes and high unemployment), and diasporas make 
countries more prone to civil wars, both by providing revenues to insurgent groups to 
sustain their rebellions and by weakening the power of the central authority to suppress 
insurgent activities.  
Chapter III provides information about war economies, and presents the economic 
challenges of unstable post-conflict environment. The chapter emphasizes that challenges 
such as a fragile security and economic environment, illicit economic activities and peace 
spoilers must be overcome to achieve enduring peace. The chapter also gives some 
proper policy responses to cope with them.  
Chapter IV introduces a Kosovo case study to apply the economic dimensions 
discussed in the previous chapters. The chapter provides the background that led to civil 
war, explains the post-conflict economic environment, discusses the international 
community’s economic-recovery efforts, and recommends policy responses for economic 
development. 
Chapter V summarizes the main issues presented in the chapters. The conclusion 
also emphasizes the importance of studying economic dimensions to implement effective 
policies that will secure peace and provide development.  
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A. THE MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis claims that economic perspectives should be put into consideration in 
a much broader sense when analyzing civil wars, due to their impacts on conflict 
dynamics. Many researches demonstrate that the rise of civil war, its intensity and 
character, its maintenance, its ending, and the risk of a return violence in post-conflict 
settings, correlate with economic variables rather than social grievances.1 Social 
inequalities, and ethnic, religious and regional differences are useful mediums for 
gathering people around a common cause, but the financial capability of these people to 
initiate and sustain a war against central authority is the main factor that spurs violence.2 
The primary question addressed in this thesis is as follows: What are the economic risk 
factors that make countries more prone to civil wars, and how should economic 
challenges in post-conflict environments be dealt with in order to prevent a return to 
violence? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
People generally believe that social grievances, and religious and ethnic hostilities 
are the main causes of armed conflicts.3 Economic analysis demonstrates that social 
grievances such as inequalities, and ethnic and religious differences are useful media for 
armed groups to use in stirring up dissension and recruiting new rebels more easily, but 
economic agendas, or at least the economic feasibility of military struggle have much 
more influence on spurring violence.4 Paul Collier claims that: “Civil war occurs where 
                                                 
1 Karen Ballentine, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed 
Conflict,” in Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman(eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Beyond 
Greed & Grievance,(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,2003), 259. 
2 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” in Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall (eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World 
(Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press,2007), 197. 
3 David Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” in Mats Berdal and David M. 
Malone(eds.), Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars” (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2000), 20. 
4 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done 
About It (New York:Oxford University Press, 2007), 23. 
 2 
rebel organizations are viable.”5 His explanation of the failure of the Michigan Militia 
and success of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to initiate 
insurgency lies in their opportunities to raise money rather than the ideals they claim to 
embrace. He states: 
Regardless of why the organization is fighting, it can fight only if it is 
financially viable during the conflict. War cannot be fought just on hopes 
or hatreds. Predatory behavior may not be the objective of the rebel 
organization, but it is its means of financing the conflict.6  
Furthermore, the political economy of civil conflict has impacts on peace-building 
efforts. Studies on conflicts in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
many other civil war-affected countries indicate that violence can serve a range of 
political and economic functions for combatants, civilians and foreign actors taking part 
in the conflict. In most cases, groups, benefiting from war economies may not have an 
interest ending the violence.7 Therefore, defining the economic risk factors for preventing 
conflicts, understanding war economies for better evaluating socio-economic realities and 
presenting post-conflict economic challenges to create appropriate policy responses are 
three important tasks to be addressed by policy-makers. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are two hypotheses that can be formulated based on the literature analyzing 
economic causes of civil conflicts. The first hypothesis assumes that, the risk of civil 
conflict correlates with the economic conditions in a given country. Countries having 
valuable natural resources, suffering from a poor economic performance of their 
governments for a long period of time, and having a strong diaspora that funds grievances 
are more susceptible to civil conflicts. Insurgency behavior is significantly dependent on 
the economic circumstances of a given country. Defining and analyzing these risks, and 
introducing ways to eliminate them may yield valuable results for conflict-prevention. 
                                                 
5 Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict,”197. 
6 Ibid., 198. 
7 Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” 24. 
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The second hypothesis posits that the economic challenges presented in the post-
conflict country, such as the fragile economic environment, dealing with peace spoilers, 
harnessing informal economies, and persuading rebels to disarm by shaping new futures 
for them have impacts on achieving durable peace. An inability to cope with these 
challenges may both cause a return to violence and hinder economic development. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Based on empirical data over the period 1965–1999, Paul Collier claims that the 
risk of civil war is strongly correlated with economic variables rather than social 
grievances. Contrary to general belief, inequality, the lack of liberal democratic norms 
and values, and ethnic and religious disparities do not have a significant impact on the 
risk of civil conflict. His main argument is that “civil war occurs where rebel 
organizations are viable.” He asserts that “dependence on primary-commodity exports 
and low national income” are the main factors propelling civil conflicts. 8 On the other 
hand, David Keen, who is more focused on the interactions of grievances and the 
economic motivations of belligerents, argues that political agendas have been replaced by 
economic agendas and economic motivations, and he analyzes the economic functions of 
warfare.9 Similarly, Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke evaluate the influences of 
both economic and social elements on spurring civil conflicts: 
Economic incentives and opportunities have not been the only or even the 
primary cause of these armed conflicts; rather, to varying degrees, they 
interacted with socioeconomic and political grievances, interethnic 
disputes, and security dilemmas in triggering the outbreak of warfare.10  
The thesis values the importance of both the social and economic motivations of 
belligerents, as well as their roles in stirring dissension in different circumstances. 
However, the thesis considers the financial ability of the rebels to sustain their insurgent 
activities as the fundamental cause of civil wars.  
                                                 
8 Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict,” 197. 
9 Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” 22.  
10 Ballentine, “Beyond Greed and Grievance,” 260. 
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Jonathan Goodhand addresses war economies by dividing them into three types; 
combat, shadow and coping economies. He claims that these interlinked economies 
involve different actors with dissimilar motivations using different mediums to 
implement their economic activities. In addition to predatory and profit-seeking concerns, 
coping and survival are the other considerations that should be taken into account when 
dealing with war economies.11 Although he discusses the difficulty of transforming war 
economies into peace-time conditions, his analysis does not include the question of how 
this transformation could be managed successfully. The thesis fills the gap by explaining 
the social and political aspects of economic activities in wartime in order to implement 
proper policies for a smooth transformation to peace-time conditions without causing 
social unrest. 
Achim Wennmann claims that peace-makers usually tend to focus on political and 
military issues in the initial stages of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction 
missions, and he emphasizes the need for focusing more on the economic recovery of a 
given country to achieve durable peace.12 He presents “the opportunities and pitfalls of 
addressing economic issues in peace processes.” Although he recommends some 
policies, like “charting new futures, constructing new partnerships with economic actors 
and engaging the business community,” his article does not deal much with the economic 
problems and challenges presented in the war-torn country. The thesis introduces 
economic challenges, such as the fragile economic environment, illicit economic 
activities and peace spoilers, then presents the policy recommendations. It is not easy to 
offer an effective guideline to any given country since the distinct economic 
characteristics of different countries entail dissimilar solutions. Nonetheless, establishing 
                                                 
11 Jonathan Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy? Reconstruction and State Building 
in Afghanistan,”  Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, (2004), 155. Accessed August 22, 2012.  
http://www.relooney.info/SI_Expeditionary/Afghanistan-Entrepreneurship_5.pdf 
12 Achim Wennmann, “Peace Processes, Business and New Futures after War,” in Mats Berdal and 
Achim Wennmann(eds.), Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives, Adelphi Series, 
(New York : Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010),15. 
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global control regimes to specific goods to curb insurgents’ revenues13, building robust 
economic institutions to overcome shadow economies14, and alleviating socio-economic 
problems by providing economic opportunities to the population15 are proven 
fundamental responses to these challenges. 
Nitzschke and Studdard discuss the impacts of the political economy on the 
mediation process and the design of the peace agreement. They consider the existence of 
lucrative natural resources and their effects on the number of profit-seekers as key 
elements in an unsuccessful peace-making process. Their study emphasizes the need for 
incorporating insurgency groups in peace processes, which may require both political and 
economic arrangements including; control over mines, markets and economic and 
industrial infrastructure.16 It is important that combatant groups should have some 
financial expectation about the future. A peace agreement that incorporates positive 
economic elements for anyone, including loot-seekers, may become an encouraging force 
in establishing long-lasting peace. However, balancing combatant demands with 
economic realities may bring negotiations to a halt. The combatants, comparing their 
profits in war and the expected benefits of peace, may act as spoilers of the peace 
processes.17  Their findings are particularly important in the Kosovar case because 
                                                 
13 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, “The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict 
Transformation,” Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (2005), 11. Accessed 
August 22, 2012. http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue3_ballentine_nitzschke.pdf 
14 Paivi Lujala, Siri Aas Rustad and Philippe Le Billon, “Valuable Natural Resources in Conflict 
Affected States,” in Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann(eds.), Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: 
Economic Perspectives, Adelphi Series (New York : Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2010), 133. 
15 Johanna Mendelson Forman, “Achieving Socioeconomic Well‐ Being,” Washington Quarterly, 
Autumn 2002, 126. Accessed August 22, 2012.  http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB119.pdf. 
16 Heiko Nitzschke and Kaysie Studdard, “The Legacies of War Economies: Challenges and Options 
for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding,” International Peacekeeping, 12, 2 Summer 2005, (London: 
Routledge), 226. 
17 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, “The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict 
Transformation,” 6. 
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current criminal activities may be related to some policy mistakes on dealing with strong 
criminal organization in the peace processes.18  
Ballentine and Nitzschke claim that contemporary insurgency activities need to 
finance themselves in order to sustain their rebellion. Their ability to get revenues is 
highly related to their global trading capacity. They recommend that decision-makers in 
the peace-making process consider curtailing and managing resource flows both 
regionally and internationally by implementing control regimes. Rather than struggling to 
force armed groups to compromise, or intervening using military force, diminishing self-
financing abilities may yield valuable results. Commodity-sanction regimes aimed at the 
predatory exploitation of natural resources, and interdiction regimes targeted at organized 
crime activities, drug and human trafficking, corruption and money laundering can be 
helpful instruments to cut revenue flows to rebellion groups.19  
Lujala, Rustad and Le Billon present the poor governance of natural resources as 
the main causes of civil conflicts in many resource dependent countries. As they stated: 
“Unsurprisingly, badly governed countries with poor populations living in areas with 
easily lootable resources are among the most challenging contexts.”20 Resource and 
development relation largely depends on the quality of the governance. For example, in 
Nigeria, resource revenues are absorbed by corrupt national and local officials, so that no 
remains for the development of the Niger delta. Likewise, in Myanmar, large amounts of 
revenue were spent by the governments to increase the military capacity of their rule in 
order to more easily suppress their people. 21 
James Cockayne addresses the peace-building efforts in his study “Crime, 
Corruption and Violent Economies.” He argues that peace-building efforts should focus 
on giving positive economic incentives to criminal organizations. Creating better 
prospects with economic development assist to transform them to legitimate economic 
                                                 
18 Alexandros Yannis, “Kosovo: The Political Economy of Conflict and Peacebuilding,” in Karen 
Ballentine & Jake Sherman(eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Beyond Greed & Grievance 
(Colorado: Lyenne Rienner Publishers,2003), 187. 
19 Ballentine and Nitzschke, “The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation,” 11. 
20 Lujala et al., “Valuable Natural Resources,” 134. 
21 Ibid., 135. 
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actors. He claims that if these organizations view their criminal activities as more 
profitable, they may decide to continue their illegal activities in peace-time.22  However, 
it is difficult to distinguish when criminal armed groups will be opponents and when they 
become a partner in the peace process. The thesis will present some of the challenges of 
dealing with these criminal organizations on the domestic and international levels.  
In his article “Achieving Socioeconomic Well-Being in Post-Conflict Settings,” 
Forman presents the difficulties of achieving socio-economic well-being in post-conflict 
reconstruction mission. He claims that providing basic needs to only refugees and 
displaced person is not proper way to address the problem. Almost all citizens may in 
need of basic human needs like food and shelter. He emphasizes the need for providing 
health facilities, educational systems, and a socially secure environment to effectively 
address initial socio-economic problems in conflict affected societies. Then, subsequent 
socio-economic efforts should be directed to the improvement of physical infrastructure, 
creating employment opportunities, establishing a legal regulatory framework, forming 
financial institutions, and providing conditions for international trade and investments.23 
The thesis will test his findings by applying them to a Kosovo case, and add some other 
particular requirements for achieving socio-economic prosperity in Kosovo. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will focus on a case-study approach by analyzing the conflict in 
Kosovo. The case provides an opportunity to test different argument about the economic 
risk factors causing civil conflicts, war economies, the economic challenges in a post-
conflict environment, and giving proper policy responses to them. Many examples are 
drawn from other civil war experiences to illustrate the economic issues on conflict 
prevention and post-conflict peace-building, and to compare and contrast them to Kosovo 
case.  
                                                 
22 James Cockayne, “Crime, Corruption and Violent Economies,” in Mats Berdal and Achim 
Wennmann(eds.), Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives, Adelphi Series (New York : 
Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010) 204. 
23 Forman, “Achieving Socioeconomic Well-Being in Post-Conflict Settings,” 126. 
 8 
I will utilize the sources presented in the literature review section of this proposal. 
For raw and statistical data, the primary sources will be from reliable international 
organizations, such as International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United 
Nations. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis has five chapters: (1) an introduction, (2) the economic risk factors 
causing civil conflicts, and ways to eliminate them, (3) the economic dimensions of 
peace-building (4) a Kosovo case study, and (5) the conclusion.  
Chapter II discusses the economic risk factors that cause civil conflicts. Specific 
economic characteristics of a given country, such as the availability of natural resources, 
enduring economic decline (with its effects of low incomes and high unemployment), and 
diasporas make countries more prone civil wars both by providing revenues to insurgent 
groups to sustain their rebellions and by weakening the power of the central authority to 
suppress insurgent activities.  
Chapter III provides information about war economies, and presents the economic 
challenges of unstable post-conflict environment. The chapter emphasizes the challenges 
such as a fragile economic environment, illicit economic activities and peace spoilers 
must be overcome to achieve enduring peace. The chapter also gives some proper policy 
responses to cope with them.  
Chapter IV introduces a Kosovo case study to apply the economic dimensions 
discussed in the previous chapters. The chapter provides the background that led to civil 
war, explains the post-conflict economic environment, discusses the international 
community’s economic-recovery efforts, and recommends policy responses for economic 
development. 
Chapter V summarizes the main issues presented in the chapters. The conclusion 
also emphasizes the importance of studying economic dimensions to implement effective 
policies that will secure peace and provide development.  
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II. ECONOMIC RISK FACTORS CAUSING CIVIL CONFLICTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The incidence of civil war is associated with an armed group’s financial capability 
to sustain its costly struggle against government forces in a prolonged conflict. Initiating 
a war against a central authority requires at least forming a military organization, and 
providing equipment, weapons and ammunitions to them in a continuous manner.24 
Social grievances which can be rooted in ancient hatreds, inequality, a lack of democracy, 
and ethnic and religious divisions are useful media for the leaders of an insurgent group 
to legitimize their actions and gather dissatisfied people under a common cause; but they 
cannot provide the money and resources for the expensive undertaking of fighting against 
state forces. On the other hand, specific economic characteristics of a given country, such 
as the availability of natural resources, enduring economic decline with its effects of low 
incomes and a high unemployment rate, and diasporas increase the risk of civil war both 
by providing revenues to insurgent groups to sustain their rebellions and by weakening 
the power of the central authority to suppress insurgent activities.25   
B. NATURAL RESOURCES 
The availability of valuable natural resources makes countries more inclined to 
experience severe, long-lasting and recurring armed conflicts for several reasons. First, 
the availability of valuable natural resources provides revenues for armed groups to 
finance their military campaigns. Furthermore, the combatants are motivated to fight in 
order to capture resources.26 Second, reliance on natural resources hinders economic 
development by reducing economic growth and increasing poverty. Slow growth 
intensifies unemployment which makes it easy for insurgent groups to recruit new 
                                                 
24 Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, “Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: What We Can Do?,” in Ian 
Bannon and Paul Collier(eds.), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict Options and Actions (Washington 
D.C.:World Bank Publications,2003), 3. 
25 Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington 
D.C.:World Bank Publications, 2003), 53. 
26 Lujala et al., “Valuable Natural Resources,” 124 
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rebels.27 Third, severe disagreements about sharing the revenues from lucrative natural 
resources fuel greed and grievances among certain groups in the society. The perceptions 
about unequal sharing of revenues may cause secessionist movements in the resource-
rich country.28 
1. The Role of Natural Resources in Financing Conflict and Motivating 
Rebels to Fight for Resource Capture 
The availability of lucrative natural resources such as oil, diamonds, timber and 
drugs increases the risk of civil conflict by providing high and easy revenues to rebels to 
initiate and maintain a war against central authority. Rebel organizations acquire large 
amount of money from lucrative natural resources whether by directly looting or heavily 
taxing them. Furthermore, the presence of lucrative natural resources attracts the leaders 
of insurgent groups, or even ordinary members to continue confronting the central 
authority in order to maintain their controls on the resources.29 Rebel organizations 
acquire large sums of money from primary commodity exports with controlling the routes 
of valuable produced exports from the production place to international markets. The 
insurgencies in Sierra Leone in 1990s and Angola were long lasting because of 
belligerents’ motivation of resource capture. 30  
Collier argues that the countries that are heavily reliant on primary commodity 
exports as a main revenue resource are more prone to experience civil conflicts. The 
primary commodity exports present opportunities for predatory behavior, both for 
insurgent groups and governments. Governments seek to benefit from primary 
commodity exports by getting tax revenues whereas rebel groups seek to exploit them to 
sustain their military activities. Many crime groups desiring to continue exploiting 
lucrative resources transform themselves into rebellious groups in order to have enough 
                                                 
27 Michael Ross, “The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor,” in Ian Bannon and 
Paul Collier(eds.), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict Options and Actions (Washington D.C.:World 
Bank Publications, 2003), 19. 
28 Lujala et al., “Valuable Natural Resources,” 124,125. 
29 Ross, “The Natural Resource Curse,” 30. 
30 Lujala et al., “Valuable Natural Resources,” 124. 
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members to confront with the government’s forces.31 According to Collier’s analysis 
with Hoeffler, if a country’s primary commodity export dependence is twenty-six percent 
of its gross domestic products (GDP), it has a risk of conflict of twenty-three percent. If it 
had no dependence on primary commodity exports, the risk of conflict fall to only one-
half of one percent.32 Figure1 shows the risk of civil war in low-income countries 
according to their dependence on primary commodity exports.33 
 
Risk of Civil Conflict 
 
Primary-Commodity Exports as a Share of GDP 
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In most cases, the risk and type of civil conflict is related to the mode of exploitation of 
specific resources. Lootable resources, such as alluvial gemstones, narcotic crops, timber, or 
coltan drive non-separatist rebellious activities in places such as Sierra Leone, Colombia, and 
Afghanistan, while unlootable resources like diamonds, deep-shaft minerals, oil, and gas are 
correlated with separatist conflicts. Technology, special expertise and enough capital are required 
to get revenue from unlootable resources; by contrast,  lootable resources can easily be exploited 
by a small number of unprofessional workers.34 Insurgency groups easily looted the alluvial 
diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola due to their simple extraction that did not require 
sophisticated and expensive technology.35  
The different dynamics of lootable and unlootable resource driven conflicts explains the 
paradox of why diamonds are regarded as a source of wealth in Botswana, but cause conflicts in 
Sierra Leone. First, Sierra Leone’s alluvial diamonds in riverbeds are easily looted by the rebels, 
whereas Botswana’s deep-shaft, kimberlite diamonds necessitate expensive equipment, special 
expertise, and substantive capital to be mined, which is unattractive to an insurgency. 
Additionally, the mismanaged and corrupt diamond sector in Sierra Leone by comparison with 
Botswana’s wisely managed diamond mines explains the different outcomes from the same 
natural resource.36 
Additionally, rebel groups earn large sums of money from agricultural products in the 
regions under their control whether producing themselves or levying high taxes on the locals. The 
best known example is the cultivation of illegal drugs from which the FARC in Colombia 
acquired about U.S.$500 million per year. The mujahedeen in Afghanistan also started to 
cultivate illegal drugs when they were not able to be funded by the United States. Similarly, in 
Sierra Leone, insurgent groups fund their activities by imposing taxes on coffee production.37 
2. Mismanagement of Natural Resources 
A significant number of resource-rich countries suffer from resource curse 
whether it stems from Dutch disease, rentier states, poor management of resource 
revenues, or bad political decisions of their leaders. Government mismanagement of 
                                                 
34 Ballentine and Nitzschke, “The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation,” 6. 
35 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, 90. 
36 Ballentine and Nitzschke, “The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation,” 6. 
37 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, 76. 
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resource revenues and inequalities in allocation of resource revenues are other factors that 
trigger civil wars in resource-rich countries.38  
Mostly rooted in heavy reliance on resource wealth, many countries have suffered 
from economic and political underperformance of their governments, weakening their 
capacity to suppress rebel movements. Lack of diversification in economic activities, 
large scale corruption, wasteful spending of revenues, and inability to control resource 
rich regions are some factors that account for the poor economic conditions, and 
vulnerability to civil war in those countries richly endowed with natural resources.39   
Although Nigeria’s revenues from rich oil resources have reached about 1.6 
trillion dollars since 1980s, they could not prevent a sharp increase in the poverty level. 
Critical failures in managing the money caused social and political instability which 
worsened overall economic activities. Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo are 
two other examples of countries suffering from the political and economic 
underperformance of their governments. The populist policies of rulers, short-term 
benefit-seeking behaviors and national ambitions resulting in overspending and poor 
investments are some of the reasons for resource curse. The resultant negative impacts on 
the economy, political institutions and society in general generate grievances that can 
promote unrest and conflict. 40 
Lack of diversification in economic activities is one of the most dangerous 
consequences of resource curse. Easy revenues earned by lucrative natural resources 
correlate with a country’s weak capacity to innovate due to lack of producing industries. 
Resource-rich countries become more dependent on valuable natural resources and 
unable to diversify their economic activities, which cause them to fail to innovate. An 
abundance of lucrative natural resources yielding a large amount of money negatively 
influences the allotment of money and workers to other economic sectors. High reliance 
on resource revenues also has significant impact on the development capacity of 
                                                 
38 Lujala et al., “Valuable Natural Resources,” 122. 
39 Ross, “The Natural Resource Curse,” 24–27. 
40 Lujala et al., “Valuable Natural Resources,” 126. 
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institutions of a given country which then leads to corruption and poor governance of 
economic activities. Furthermore, resource curse may generate the characteristics of the 
rentier state, which eventually cause state fragility and high risk of civil conflict. 41 
3. Unequal Allocation of Revenues 
Greed over sharing the revenues of valuable natural resources creates grievances 
and insurgency which generally results in further greed and grievances. The unequal 
allocation of valuable resource revenues increases the greed and grievances of different 
ethnic or religious groups. Economic inequality can be rooted in both unequal 
distribution of revenues and unequal ownership of lands.42 
Natural resources are not fairly distributed over a country, but in most cases are 
concentrated in certain areas. The risk of civil war heightens if the locals feel themselves 
ethnically or religiously different from the rest of the population. The local population 
may prefer to possess all the revenues for themselves rather than share them with the 
entire population, which give incentive to secessionist movements. Even they could not 
secede completely; the rebel organization’s relative control in some resource-rich 
territories could be supported by locals.43   
In some cases, rich minority groups desire to secede from the poor majority in 
order not to bear their burdens anymore. Located in the oil producing region, Aceh 
people are three times more affluent than their country’s average, and they do not want to 
pay taxes for the poor majority in Indonesia. Zaire, Nigeria and Eritrea suffered from 
similar secessionist movements initiated by rich minorities living in the resource-rich 
regions.44 
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Even a fair distribution of revenues from valuable natural resources may not 
prevent conflicts, due to rising expectations. If a resource rich region is deprived of a 
good amount of revenues, the risk of armed conflict may increase, as in the example of 
Aceh. Similarly, in Niger, rebel groups complained about the government’s exploiting 
uranium in their region but not distributing the revenues back. The negative effects of the 
extraction process such as pollution, and population displacements can cause armed 
conflict. The civil war in Papua New Guinea was started by local residents who were 
complaining about environmental destructiveness and the unfair distribution of 
revenues.45 
4. Eliminating Risk Factors Stemming From Natural Resources 
Diversification of economic activity away from dependence on primary 
commodities, combined with better policies, reduces the risk of civil conflict by lowering 
the motivations for predation on resources. Diversification of an economy entails 
technical expertise and technology. The mismanagement of economic activities increases 
dependence on lucrative natural resources, whereas investing in education and human 
capital helps on to diversify efforts. Many governments prefer getting high revenues from 
primary commodity exports rather than investing in diversified economic activities. The 
international community can encourage and help governments to adopt better economic 
policies that prompt diversification.46 
A Government’s ability to spend easy revenues from natural resources on public-
beneficial programs has an effect on conflict prevention, with respect to the amount of 
support the government has from the population. People are unsympathetic to rebel 
activities if they know that their government spends money for their basic needs such as 
education, health, and infrastructure. Conversely, they are sympathetic to a rebel 
organization that confronts a corrupted central authority whose top officials are seeking 
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personal enrichment. Transparent economic practices in public sector increase 
governments’ popularity and make loot-seeking rebel groups unpopular.47  
Establishing control mechanisms on the trade of natural resources lessens the 
opportunity for rebels to acquire large sums of easy money with which to sustain armed 
conflict. International control and interdiction regimes make it more difficult for 
insurgency groups to sell the commodities that they loot.48 Although these preventive 
measures can not completely eliminate the rebels’ ability to exploit resources, control 
mechanisms do reduce their prices and shrink the revenues of insurgent groups. The 
Kimberley Process obstructs rebel groups from trading diamonds in international markets 
and cuts their revenue sources. The initiative can be a good model for other lootable 
resources such as timber and oil. 49 
C. POOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENTS 
Countries whose economies are managed badly for a long period are more 
susceptible to civil conflicts. Poor economic performance of government is associated 
with state failure, economic decline, slow growth, low incomes, poverty, and high 
unemployment rates, all of which weaken the state’s capacity to deal with insurgent 
groups, and increase rebel organization’s chances of survival. Figure 2 shows how a 
small amount of additional growth reduces the risk of conflict in a typical low-income 
country.50 
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                         Risk of Civil Conflict 
 
Figure 2.   Economic performance and the risk of civil war 
Mismanagement of economic activities may also cause grievances which further 
invite civil conflicts. The economic underperformance of certain governments imposes 
pain among large numbers of people, and they may be confronted with insurgency from 
their discontented populations. The National Resistance Movement rebellion in Uganda 
was largely instigated by the incompetence of successive governments on economic 
issues.51 
1. Failed States 
Social and economic inequality, weak government performance, and an unstable 
environment are some characteristics of a fragile environment. A fragile environment 
enables organized crime groups and gangs to evolve into the insurgency groups, 
motivates ethnically and ideologically different groups to seek retaliation and revenge, 
and entices rebels, as well as civil and military officials, to benefit from violence.52 
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 States without legitimate central governments, whose governments are not 
capable of exerting their authority in some regions of the country, and whose population 
is deprived of the most basic needs, are named as fragile or failing states. Three types of 
fragile states create conducive conditions for civil conflicts. If the legitimacy of the 
central authority is questioned, rebel groups will be emboldened to fill the gap such as in 
the case of Somali. If a government has difficulty in controlling some of its territories, 
insurgent groups will flourish and try to expand their rule, as in Pakistan. If the 
government is not able to provide basic needs and safety net to its population, insurgent 
groups will do it by recruiting new rebels and extracting money and resources from them, 
as has happened in some African countries. 53 
2. Economic Decline 
Conflict is more likely to occur in countries suffering from economic decline. 
Collier’s data suggests that “each percentage point off the growth rate of per capita 
income raises the risk of conflict by around one percentage point.” He also points out 
how lacking of economic opportunities relates with poor education, and brings higher 
risk of civil conflict. The rebel organization has an easier task if there are few job 
opportunities, little schooling, and many young people needing work.54 Economic growth 
encourages to people to maintain their lives in compliance with the ruling authority, 
whereas economic decline may motivate people to rebel against it.55 
Poverty is not directly correlated with violence or civil conflicts, but is an 
indication of the lessening capacity of the state to protect and provide basic needs to the 
people. It is not a coincidence that fifteen of the world’s twenty poorest countries have 
had an intrastate war in the last three decades.56  
                                                 
53 John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” The Washington 
Quarterly, Autumn 2002, 86. 
54 Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict,” 206 
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3. Low Incomes and High Unemployment Rates 
Low incomes and high unemployment rates increase the risk of civil conflict by 
facilitating rebel recruitment and lowering the state capacity to eliminate insurgents. 
First, low incomes and high unemployment directly heighten the proportion of young 
men willing to be recruited for rebellious purposes.57 These two indicators of economic 
decline also decrease the opportunity cost of joining a rebel organization. Figure 3 shows 
that the idleness caused mainly by unemployment is the fundamental reason for an 
individual to join a rebel organization.58  
 
Incentives for Joining Rebel Organizations 
 
Figure 3.   Main incentives for joining a rebel organization. 
Low incomes and high unemployment makes rebel recruitment cheap and easy 
for insurgency groups. Rebellious groups easily recruit hopeless people whose incomes 
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are too low or who do not have a job. For example, in Zaire, the leader of the insurgent 
groups was able to form an army with only ten thousand dollars with which he aimed to 
gain control of the state.59  
Second, the state’s capacity to overthrow rebel groups is weakened, due to its 
inability to finance army and police forces through getting revenues from taxation. 
Therefore, the government cannot act efficiently to eradicate insurgent organization. 
Slow economic growth and rapid population growth cause unemployment and decrease 
salaries both of which make insurgency more likely and help rebel recruitment.60  
4. Eliminating Risk Factors Stemming From Poor Economic 
Performance of Governments 
Economic growth reduces the risk of civil war through its positive influence on 
income levels and employment rates. Bannon and Collier introduces “domestic policies, 
international aid and access to global markets” as effective instruments for sustaining 
economic growth. These three factors reduce reliance on primary commodity exports by 
diversifying economic activities, strengthening the fragility of economies against volatile 
prices and market speculations, and ameliorating infrastructure in the country.61 
Ways to reducing the risk factors derived from economic decline and slow growth 
vary according to countries’ characteristics and it is hard to find easy solutions for them. 
However, it is possible to solve these problems with effective policies. For example, 
South Korea managed to grow its annual per-capita income from $300 to $10000 in a 
short time. Policy change is not easy in most poor countries because of short-term 
economic expectations. International aid can be a pushing factor in recovering from 
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the help of international aid. The economic growth made it more difficult for insurgent 
groups to find new fighters, which was recruiting rebels for only for $150 in poor 
economic conditions.62 
D. THE AVAILAIBILTY OF DIASPORA  
1. Diaspora Effect on Funding Violence 
Diasporas have a large impact on spurring civil conflicts, both by providing 
financial support to armed groups, and political support, by lobbying the rebel’s cause. 
Since they are more affluent than people in the country of origin, and are not affected by 
the abysmal consequences of war, diasporas adherently support armed insurrections.63  
Diaspora communities’ weight of influence the dynamics of civil wars 
significantly increased within the international system after the Cold War, due to changes 
in the nature of war, and globalization.  
First, before the Cold War, insurgent movements were dependent on the political 
and financial support of super powers to initiate and maintain armed struggle. There were 
many examples of this kind of support in the Cold War. Each superpower supported 
governments aligned with itself or supported insurgencies that might oust opponent 
rulers. Since they are deprived of super power patronage in the new international system, 
armed groups resort to diasporas to fund their military activities.64 Similarly, the enemies 
of a given country may provide financial support insurgency within that country in order 
to weaken it. Some countries may support rebellion in neighboring countries, which most 
probably contain clashing internal interests with them, such as in the case of Uganda and 
Sudan. The Ugandan government funded the rebellious activities of the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army; in response, Sudan provided financial support for the 
insurgency of Lord’s Resistance Army in the northern region of Uganda.65  
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Second, ethnic, religious and cultural sentiments became central themes in the 
nature of contemporary conflicts. Diasporic communities are inclined to demonstrate 
their affiliation with groups in the motherland and share their ideals by at least financing 
their endeavors.66  Because they or their ancestors have been the victims of old conflicts, 
diasporas can have a strong sense of hatred and desire for vengeance towards the ruling 
authority.67 
Third, globalization increased the emotional feelings of interconnectedness and 
social relations through the availability of communicative means and the mobility of 
people. Diasporic communities are well aware of the social, political and economic 
situation in their homelands, because of the mass media and Internet. Broadcasts about 
the discrimination of the ruling authority, their oppressive and brutal policies, and the 
sufferings of people of origin increased their desire to help.68  
2. Eliminating Risk Factors Stemming from Diaspora’s Funding 
Grievances 
The risks stemming from diasporas can be eliminated by encouraging them to 
assume responsibilities in the peace-making processes and post-conflict reconstruction 
missions. According to how they are oriented in civil conflicts; diasporic organizations 
can assume either a constructive or destructive role in the process. Giving diasporic 
communities incentives to participate in the peace-process may prevent their funding of 
violence. They should be informed that the consequences of war are high and that people 
are suffering much in their homelands. For instance, the Irish-American community 
funded the civil conflict in Northern Ireland for years. When the peace process begun, the 
diasporas again became the major actor in peace negotiations. Furthermore, diasporic 
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communities can provide major capital for the development of their war-torn homelands. 
Their money, expertise, and business connections are invaluable assets for the economic 
recovery of their homelands.69  
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III. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF PEACE-BUILDING  
A. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN WAR-TORN COUNTRIES  
1. War Economies 
A war economy contains all the economic activities performed in wartime 
conditions. Transforming war economies into peacetime conditions is hard and takes a 
long time. Jonathan Goodhand divides war economies into three types; combat, shadow 
and coping economies. These interlinked economies involve different actors with 
dissimilar motivations using different mediums to implement their economic activities. In 
addition to predatory and profit seeking concerns, coping and survival are the other 
considerations that should be taken into account when dealing with  war economies.70  
A combat economy comprises all economic activities to initiate and sustain a 
conflict. It includes a state’s military and police forces, insurgency groups, and conflict 
entrepreneurs who provide weapons, ammunitions, and military equipment to warring 
groups. Taxation of both legal and illegal economic activities, such as smuggled goods, 
opium, or valuable resources; looting and stripping of economic assets, manipulation of 
aid, economic blockades of dissenting districts, and printing money are some of the 
activities in a combat economy. Most of the actors in combat economies are contented 
with the conflict conditions. For most of them, transformation to peacetime would mean 
loss of wealth and their powerful status. 71 
A shadow economy includes a variety of informal economic interactions out of 
state regulation and control. Disordered conflict conditions offer opportunities for 
criminal organizations and businessmen to get high revenues. The black market economy 
and smuggling in Sierra Leone, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are typical shadow 
economy characteristics.72 Profit-seekers benefit from highly liberal economic conditions 
and lack of a state monitoring and control. Cross-border smuggling of commodities, the 
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smuggling of high-value commodities, the opium trade, exploitation of natural resources 
like timber and marble, and aid manipulation are some of the economic activities in 
shadow economies. Actors in a shadow economy may prefer it to peace if it presents 
alternatives for investments and legal commercial activities.73 Chaotic wartime 
conditions enable belligerents to easily deal in shadow economies that serve to sustain a 
combat economy. The Kosovo Liberation Army financed its armed insurgency with the 
help of informal economies, such as smuggling and diaspora remittances. Similarly, the 
rebel groups in Sierra Leone sustained their rebellion with the shadow economy of the 
diamond industry.74  
A coping economy encompasses the activities of poor and vulnerable populations. 
Poor families and communities maintain asset bases through low-risk activities, or to 
survive through asset erosion. Small businesses, trading, farming, humanitarian 
assistance and migration of the workforce are some of the key activities in coping 
economies. The actors in coping economies hope for peace to go beyond subsistence.75 
Lootable resources are generally a main means of survival in coping economies, for 
example such as coltan and gold in Democratic Republic of Congo and poppy and coca 
in Afghanistan and Colombia.76 
Understanding the he social and political aspects of economic activities in 
wartime are crucial to implementing proper policies for a smooth transformation to 
peace-time conditions without creating opportunities for insurgent groups to recruit new 
rebels. Economic activity never stops even in most severe war conditions. A war 
economy contains all the economic activities performed in wartime conditions. The 
struggles to adapt these economies into a legal and regulatory framework in a post-
conflict environment pose security challenges in the long run.77  
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2. Economic Challenges in Peace Negotiations 
Peace-makers usually tend to focus on political and military issues in the initial 
phases of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions, whereas the economic 
incentives of warring groups and other economic challenges are often relegated to 
subsequent phases. However, economic issues are one of the main underlying causes of 
civil conflicts, and achieving durable peace is largely dependent on the economic 
recovery of a given country. Because a stable economy and development present 
alternatives to prolonged conflict and instability, they have to be considered as the most 
important elements in the peace-making process.78  
The economic dimensions of an ended conflict have serious impacts on the 
mediation process and the design of a peace agreement. Research shows that the 
availability of lucrative natural resources and their effect on profit-seekers is a key 
element in unsuccessful peace-making process. Moreover, if the conflict is terminated 
without the complete victory of either side, insurgency groups have to be included in the 
peace process which may require both political and economic arrangements including 
control over mines, markets and economic and industrial infrastructure.79  
It is important that combatant groups have some financial expectation about the 
future. The peace agreement that incorporates positive economic elements for anyone, 
including loot-seekers, may become an encouraging force in establishing long-lasting 
peace. As Wennman states:  
If armed conflict is really about greed, the only requirement to end a 
conflict would be show that belligerents can make more money within the 
bounds of a functioning state, private sector investment and a lasting 
peace.80 
Sharing revenues from natural resources is especially important when the 
allocation of revenues was the main cause of conflict. The optimum distribution of 
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revenues may have a positive impact on pacifying warring factions and also meet 
economic goals of development.81  
3. Dealing with Peace Spoilers 
The economic agendas of armed groups should be analyzed to achieve a 
successful transition from civil conflict to peace. Nitzschke and Studdard identify the 
process as “a realignment of political interests and a readjustment of economic strategies 
rather than a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production, or from 
repression to democracy.”82 Many transitions from war to peace show that armed groups 
become reluctant to participate in peace processes if they are benefiting from economic 
activities in the enduring conflict. Moreover, an expectation to exploiting lucrative 
resources increases the number of future spoilers.83  
Poor security conditions and an abundance of economic opportunities lead to a 
rise in various armed groups in many post-conflict regions. Criminal groups, violent 
gangs, drug cartels and other profit-seeking groups create obstacles to stakeholders in 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. There is a tendency to focus on ex-
combatants as responsible for various criminal activities, but newly emerging groups also 
seek to benefit from economic opportunities in weakly governed post-conflict 
situations.84 
Belligerents not only consider criminal activities as valid ways of financing their 
political purposes, they also see conflict-affected regions as proper territories in which to 
perform their illegal economic activities. The examples of Afghanistan and Colombia 
show that civil wars in a particular region eliminates regular financial activities, and 
creates conditions that all sides of the conflict can benefit from.85 
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The loot-seeking behavior of combatants during civil conflicts may also create 
command and control problems that frustrate peace efforts. The opportunistic behavior of 
combatants can weaken the discipline of belligerents and create agency problems that 
cause “sobel” phenomenon( soldier by day, rebel by night) observed in Angola, Sierra 
Leone, Burma, Bosnia- Herzegovina and Kosovo.86 Combatants comparing their profits 
in war against the expected benefits of peace may act as spoilers of the peace processes.87 
For example, Angola’s rebel organization leader hoarded more than $4 billion from 
diamond revenues during the first civil conflict. Demobilization efforts for his rebel 
organization, UNITA, were not successful, because it was almost impossible to offer him 
more than he expected to gain with prolonging the war.88 By contrast, an insurgency 
organization in Mozambique complied with a relatively small financial package to give 
up rebellion and transformed itself into a political party due to lack of lucrative resources 
to influence predatory behavior.89  
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is seriously challenged 
by the predatory behavior of belligerents. Afghanistan, Liberia, the DRC and Sierra 
Leone demonstrate that armed groups may use their weapons not only for securing 
themselves, but also for the exploitation of lucrative resources and civilian predation. The 
continuity of predatory behavior, both from natural resources and other economic 
activities, has an impact on a combatant’s decision to disarm.90 
4. Fragile Environment 
Conflict-affected countries show the characteristics of state fragility in which the 
abysmal conditions that caused a civil war are generally deteriorated. In most cases, 
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governments are not able to provide efficient governance and enough security and  hardly 
meet the basic needs of their people such as providing health, education and other social 
demands. This fragile environment enables old and emerging armed groups to maintain 
their criminal activities. These criminal groups pose a threat to the state’s capacity to 
exert power in some parts of the country. They may even substitute for the state by 
providing security, law and order in some regions.91  
The inefficient management of natural resources and the problem of unfair 
distribution problem are other important factors that should be dealt with quickly in post-
conflict settings. Solving deeply-rooted management problems and transforming corrupt 
natural-resource industries into well-governed, beneficial economic activities for the 
whole population are very difficult to accomplish. In Sierra Leone, the Campaign for Just 
Mining and Kono Peace Diamonds Alliance projects are focused on encouraging locals to 
be involved in the mining industry. These initiatives aimed at enlarging legal diamond 
mining, establishing financial transparency and most importantly, providing revenues for 
artisanal miners and their families.92 
5. Informal Economies 
Shadow economies are associated with the political economies of many conflict 
affected areas. Their criminal economic activities weaken post-conflict stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts. Organized criminal groups in the Balkan civil wars struggled to 
maintain their control in the economic and political processes in order to consolidate their 
power in the delicate post-conflict situation. In addition to rebel groups, police and 
military forces could be involved in criminal economic activities in some of conflict 
regions. Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, Haiti, and Burma are some examples of where 
security officials were benefited from informal economies.93  
On the other hand, informal economies provide income and livelihoods to a large 
portion of the civilian population in areas of conflict. These extensive informal economic 
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activities badly affect the government’s ability to collect tax revenues, which then 
influences the overall post-conflict reconstruction process. Deprived of large revenues, 
governments have difficulty providing basic goods and services, or even security, let 
alone implement reconstruction projects and reestablish government institutions.94 
According to World Bank data, the informal economy accounted for more than fifty 
percent of GDP in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina. People continued to subsist their 
lives, but the government could not get tax revenues from these shadow economies. 
Therefore, the state’s capacity to provide security, goods and services depended largely 
on foreign aids. Similarly, the Kosovo government could only collect half of its potential 
from public revenues in 2001, due to the illegal activities of informal economies.95  
B. POLICY OPTIONS FOR COPING WITH THE ECONOMIC 
CHALLENGES IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT 
1. Establishing Global Control Regimes to Curtail Financial Capability 
of Armed Groups to Resume Violence 
Contemporary insurgency activities need to finance themselves to sustain a 
rebellion. Their ability to get revenues is highly related to their global trading capacity. 
Decision-makers in the peace-making process may consider curtailing and managing 
resource flows both regionally and internationally, by implementing control regimes in 
order to prevent peace-spoilers from having opportunities to start violence again.96  
Rather than struggling to compel armed groups to compromise or intervening 
with military force, diminishing a rebellious group’s self-financing abilities may yield 
valuable results. Commodity sanctioning regimes aimed at the predatory exploitation of 
natural resources, and interdiction regimes targeted at organized crime activities, drug 
and human trafficking, corruption, and money laundering can be helpful instruments in 
cutting revenue flows.97  
                                                 
94 Ballentine and Nitzschke, “The Political Economy of Civil War,” 15. 
95 Nitzschke and Studdard, “The Legacies of War Economies,” 229, 230. 
96 Jonathan M.Viner and Trifin J. Roule, “Follow the Money: The Finance of Illicit Resource 
Extraction,” in Ian Bannon and Paul Collier(eds.), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict Options and 
Actions (Washington D.C.:World Bank Publications,2003), 163. 
97 Ballentine and Nitzschke, “The Political Economy of Civil War,” 11. 
 32 
Controlling regimes diminish an insurgency group’s access to resources by 
following the progress of natural resources from production to consumption. These 
tracking systems provide more natural resource revenues to the legal authorities of a 
country by preventing their illicit exploitation. With the help of well-established 
commodity-tracking system in Sierra Leone, state revenues from the diamond industry 
increased from $2 million a year to $150 million a year in less than a decade. This 
example demonstrates not only the very huge revenue that government had been deprived 
of for decades, but also the important benefit of certification system. 98  
The United Nations Security Council imposed the Kimberley Process Diamond 
Certification Scheme to reduce to role of the diamond industry in financing civil conflicts 
in Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, and DRC.99 The commodity-tracking system was first 
established in Sierra Leone, in 2003, and provided a significant decline in diamond 
trading by insurgency groups. The European Union’s Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) scheme is another commodity-tracking system, which 
aimed to track forest products passing into European Union markets. This timber-
licensing system is based on agreements between the EU and the timber-producing 
countries.100  
 On the other hand, the Publish What You Pay Campaign (PWYP) and Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) are interdiction control regimes that aim at to 
prevent corruption and corrosive rent-seeking activities of governments. These regulatory 
sanctions urge both companies and governments to implement transparency practices. 
Due to the increased influence of international criminal networks, conflict trade and 
diaspora remittances in maintaining civil wars, sanctions and interdiction policies should 
be taken into consideration in the peace- making process.101 Transparency and 
accountability policies are based on the idea that if a population is aware of their 
resources’ production and trading process, they can hold their rulers responsible about 
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their mismanagement and corruption. These mechanisms inspect both expenditures of 
resource revenues and resource contracts.102  
2. Alleviating Socioeconomic Problems 
Achieving socio-economic well-being is one of the most formidable tasks in post-
conflict reconstruction mission. Providing basic needs to refugees and displaced persons 
only is not the proper way to address the problem. Almost all citizens may require basic 
human needs like food and shelter. Additionally, the peace-builder should provide health 
facilities, educational systems and a socially secure environment in order to effectively 
address initial socio-economic problems in conflict-affected societies.103  
In some cases, peacemakers may consider tolerating criminal activities in the 
post-conflict environment, such as poppy production in some parts of the Afghanistan. 
Similarly, illegal arms and food smuggling in Bosnia played a constructive role in the 
conflict years, both balancing the military power of a violent opponent and providing for 
the social needs of the population in conflict-affected areas.104 
The allocation of profits between state and producing regions is also an important 
issue and may facilitate to reach productive results in negotiations, as happened in South 
Sudan, Aceh, and Papua New Guinea. The revenue allocation figures varies significantly 
according to the different characteristics of these countries. Oil-producing regions in 
Nigeria receive only thirteen percent of revenues generated by oil whereas Aceh in 
Indonesia receives seventy percent and South Sudan receives fifty percent of the revenues 
from the produced oil in their regions. Governments should establish a balanced revenue 
allocation system that allows development of whole country without offending producing 
regions.105  
 
                                                 
102 Viner and Roule, “Follow the Money,” 180–183. 
103 Forman, “Achieving Socioeconomic Well-Being in Post-Conflict Settings,” 126. 
104 Cockayne, “Crime, Corruption and Violent Economies,” 212. 
105 Lujala et al., “Valuable Natural Resources,” 132. 
 34 
Subsequent socio-economic efforts should direct to improvement of physical 
infrastructure, creating employment opportunities, establishing legal regulatory 
framework, forming financial institutions, providing conditions for international trade 
and investments. 106 
3. Building New Economic Institutions 
The poor governance of natural resources is one of the main causes of civil 
conflicts in many resource-dependent countries. Resource and development relation 
largely depends on quality of governance and efficient management of resources. As 
Phillippe Le Billon states: “Unsurprisingly, badly governed countries with poor 
populations living in areas with easily lootable resources are among the most 
challenging contexts.”107 For example, in Nigeria, resource revenues are absorbed by 
corrupt national and local officials, so that no money remains for the development of 
Niger delta. Likewise, in Myanmar, large amounts of revenue were spent to consolidate 
government power by increasing the military capacity of their rule. The international 
community’s efforts to help governments reform are generally unsuccessful, due to the 
central authority’s concerns about diminishing power. 108 
Given the fact that the political economies of civil conflicts are very localized, 
reforms should subsume local-level stakeholders as well as provincial and municipal 
actors. Institutions should intervene at the micro level; individuals, households, and small 
communities, and macro level; warlords, tribal and religious authorities and criminal 
leaders.109  
Coping with these challenges necessitates efficient management strategies for 
natural resources. Only robust national and local institutions can provide efficient 
management of resources and revenues. Most importantly, establishing a legal regulatory 
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framework to supervise property rights, negotiate and execute contracts, and administer 
taxation allows management of resources free from corruption. 110  
Liberia is a good example of sector-institution building. The forest sector reform 
process clearly exposed the widespread corruption and poor economic governance of the 
Liberian forests. Reformers managed to improve productivity and eradicate corruption 
and fraud by implementing efficient policies on staff training, reorganizing the sector, 
and better evaluating the size of labor. 111 
Furthermore, establishing economic institutions has a crucial impact on 
eliminating criminal economies. Realistic microeconomic and macroeconomic 
development schemes create alternatives to criminal economies. DDR programs cannot 
persuade rebels to lay down their arms without giving them economic incentives. For 
example in southern Afghanistan, a Taliban fighter has very few alternatives other than 
poppy production on which he and his family can subsist. Without establishing 
institutional reform, it is unwise to expect Taliban fighters to give up their arms and 
integrate themselves in legal economic activities.112  
4. New Visions for Future 
A post-conflict reconstruction mission should address the legacies of ethnic 
conflicts by building political institutions and providing economical social development. 
Building credible and robust institutions, generating self-sustaining economic growth and 
creating civil society and civic organizations enable people to forget their pasts and live 
peacefully again. As Wolff states:  
The essential aim of post-conflict reconstruction is to create a set of 
political, economic, and social structures in accordance with an agreed 
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democratic political process in which incentives for peaceful political 
strategies outweigh any potential benefits to be gained from a return to 
violence.113 
Peace-building efforts should focus on giving positive economic incentives to 
criminal organizations. Creating better prospects with economic development assists in 
transforming them to legitimate economic actors. If these organizations view their 
criminal activities as more profitable, they may decide to continue these activities in 
peace-time.114 As Wennmann states:  
If armed conflict is really about greed, the only requirement to end a 
conflict would be to show that belligerents can make more money within 
the bounds of a functioning state, private sector and a lasting peace.115  
However, it is difficult to distinguish when criminal armed groups will be 
opponents and when they become partners in the peace process.116 
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IV. CASE STUDY: KOSOVO 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Examination of the outbreak and evolution of the civil war in Kosovo 
demonstrates that economic variables, rather than social elements, have a significant 
impact on the course of civil conflicts, even in an ethnically and religiously divided 
country.117 The economic characteristics of a given country and insurgent groups’ 
opportunities to sustain their rebellion there require incorporating economic perspectives 
in the analysis of civil conflicts. Social grievances, which can be rooted in ancient 
hatreds, inequality, a lack of democracy, and ethnic and religious divisions are useful 
media for the leaders of the insurgent groups to use to legitimize their actions and gather 
dissatisfied people under a common cause; but they cannot provide money and resources 
for the expensive undertaking of fighting against state forces.118  
 Peaceful protest movements against the oppressive Milosevic regime turned into 
a military struggle only after Kosovar Albanians became financially capable of 
confronting the government forces in a prolonged conflict. The occurrence of civil 
conflict is related to an insurgent group’s ability to maintain their military activities 
against central authority. Initiating a war against a central authority requires at least 
forming a military organization with a group of people, and providing equipment, 
weapons and ammunitions to them in continually.119 Although religious and national 
sentiments, socio-economic inequalities, and neighborhood spillover effects had impacts 
on Kosovar Albanians’ struggle for independence from Yugoslavia, economic factors, 
such as enduring economic decline, high unemployment, low incomes, and the 
availability of an Albanian diaspora made it feasible for the Kosovo Liberation Army to 
maintain an insurgency against Serbian authorities.120  
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The economic recovery of Kosovo necessitated coping with challenges from the 
post-conflict transition, and post-socialist and post-secession transitions.121 First, the civil 
war and NATO’s air bombardment devastated the country and an already crippled 
economic situation was made worse. Infrastructure was badly damaged, houses were 
destroyed, burned or looted, and agricultural activity almost stopped because of the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons and the large scale use of land 
mines.122 Second, a volatile security environment and political uncertainty hindered post-
conflict economic recovery for years, with their negative effects on direct investments 
and entrepreneurship. Third, harnessing informal economies and dealing with potential 
peace spoilers was the main challenge for peace-makers in the aftermath of the conflict. 
The members of the KLA emerged as the new political and economic actors during the 
conflict years. These new elites did not want to lose their status, power, and wealth after 
the conflict was over.123 Fourth, the transition to a free-market economy from a centrally 
planned socialist model with the absence of economic institutions, a legal regulatory 
framework and human capital hampered economic development in the first years of the 
post-conflict economic recovery mission.124  
The international community focused mainly on the economic reconstruction of 
the country to achieve short-term success, whereas endorsing economic reforms to build 
robust economic institutions was largely neglected, which had negative repercussions in 
long-term economic development.125 Economic reconstruction efforts, like providing 
humanitarian aid, food, and other basic needs, building roads, bridges, water irrigation 
systems, and telecommunication systems were needed in the initial stages of post-conflict 
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recovery to create a good image and prevent social unrest; but prolonged old policies for 
a protracted period, hindering economic development by undermining small businesses, 
local farmers and merchants.126  
B. COUNTRY PROFILE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Country Profile 
Kosovo is situated in the Balkans. It is bordered by Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Albania. According to an April 2011 census, the population of the 
country is 1.7 million. 88% of the population is ethnic Albanians, 7% ethnic Serbs, 5% 
other communities (Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Turkish). The six stars on 
the flag represent the ethnic communities in the country. The majority ethnic Albanian 
population, as well as the Bosniak, Gorani, and Turkish communities, and some of the 
Roma/Ashkalia/Egyptian communities are Muslims that account for 91 percent of the 
population. The ethnic Serb population is largely Serbian Orthodox. Approximately 3% 
of ethnic Albanians are Roman Catholic. Albanian and Serbian are the official languages; 
Bosnian and Turkish are official only in some municipalities where significant numbers 
of these minorities reside. The adult literacy rate is about 92 percent.127  
Although Kosovo had significant political and economic troubles, it aimed to 
reach democracy and European type government style since unilaterally declaring 
independence in February 2008. However, as the poorest economy in Europe, it suffers a 
45 percent officially unemployment rate. As Figure 4 shows, poverty and extreme 
poverty rates are high both in urban and rural areas.128 The per capita GDP is about 2,600 
euros.129 Poor infrastructure, and political and legal uncertainties have resulted in limited 
foreign direct investment. The economy is dependent on the service sector, international 
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aid and remittances from the Kosovar Albanian diaspora in Europe. Remittance inflows 




Figure 4.   Kosovo, poverty and extreme poverty headcount, 2009. 
2. Historical Background  
Kosovo was an autonomous region in the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY). Under the rule of Tito, Yugoslavia had a socialist economy with 
state ownership and centralized economic planning. In this socialist model, Kosovo was 
the most underdeveloped region of the country whose centrally planned economy was 
based on state-owned industries like; heavy manufacturing, agriculture and mining.131 
In the 1980s, Yugoslavia suffered from important economic problems, which 
badly affected the Kosovars. The unemployment rate reached a peak of 58 percent in 
1988; similarly inflation rose to almost 1,200 percent in the same year. Milosevic’s 
revoking Kosovo’s autonomous status and dissolving the Kosovo parliament deteriorated 
the economic situation. As a consequence of political pressure, economic activities in the 
region diminished about 50 percent in 1989. Moreover, many ethnic Albanian state 
employees were replaced by Serbs in the region. Many Kosovo Albanians had to move to 
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European countries where they formed a strong Albanian diaspora.132 As a reaction to 
Belgrad’s political, social and economic pressures, Kosovo Albanian began a peaceful 
resistance movement in the early 1990s, led by Ibrahim Rugova. They established a 
parallel government funded mainly by the Albanian diaspora remittances and informal 
economic activities. The nonviolent movement eventually turned into armed resistance in 
the form of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).133 
Belgrade’s response was harsh against secessionist movements in the region. 
Counter-insurgency operations turned into an ethnic-cleansing campaign against Kosovar 
Albanians. More than 45 percent of the population had to flee  the country. American-led 
NATO forces intervened in March 1999. The UN established the UN Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), under the control of a Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). In 2001, UNMIK promulgated a 
constitutional framework that provided for the establishment of Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government (PISG). After long diplomacy, Kosovo declared its independence from 
Serbia on February 17, 2008.134  
C. ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE KOSOVO WAR  
Peaceful protest movements against the oppressive Milosevic regime turned into a 
military struggle only after Kosovar Albanians became financially capable of engaging 
government forces in a prolonged conflict. The occurrence of civil conflict is related with 
an insurgent group’s ability to maintain their military activities against a central 
authority. Initiating a war against a central authority requires at least forming a military 
organization with a group of people, and providing equipment, weapons and 
ammunitions to them in a continuous manner.135 Although religious and national 
sentiments, socio-economic inequalities as well as neighborhood spillover effects have 
impacts on Kosovar Albanian’s struggle for gaining independence from Yugoslavia, 
economic factors, such as enduring economic decline, high unemployment, low incomes, 
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and the availability of Albanian diaspora made it possible for KLA to maintain an 
insurgency against Serbian authorities.136  
1. Low Incomes and a High Unemployment Rate 
The KLA could easily recruit thousands of idle young men due to low incomes 
and a high unemployment rate. These two indicators of economic decline decrease the 
opportunity cost of joining a rebel organization. Rebellious groups easily recruit hopeless 
people whose incomes are too low or who do not have a job. The research shows that 
idleness caused mainly by unemployment is the fundamental reason for an individual to 
join a rebel organization or  gang.137  
Kosovo was the most underdeveloped region in Yugoslavia. Due to highly 
centralized economic policies, 60 percent of economic activities was based on 
agricultural. The Milosevic regime’s discriminatory policies deteriorated economic 
conditions further with shrinking the economic activities about 50 percent. Many 
Kosovar Albanians had to immigrate to Europe in order to earn a living for their families. 
Brain drain was another direct consequence of the abysmal economic conditions in the 
region.138 Although it is not possible to obtain exact economic figures for Kosovo under 
Yugoslavian rule, the estimated unemployment rate reached about 60 percent in the same 
years. It became easy and cheap for the KLA to recruit new members to fight the Serbian 
authorities.139 
2. The Diaspora 
Kosovar Albanian diaspora remittances played a major role in sustaining the 
rebellious activities throughout the civil war. Many Kosovar Albanians had to leave their 
country, due to the Milosevic regime’s oppressive policies and economic inequalities in 
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Kosovo. Many of them had a strong sense of hatred and desire for retribution against 
Serbian rule. They had more extreme views than the people in Kosovo about gaining 
independence by means of fighting.140  
At the beginning of the 1990s, the diaspora communities Rugova’s non-violent 
resistance by funding the parallel governance of the Democratic League of Kosovo; 
however, neighborhood effects of the Dayton Agreement and the crisis in Albania 
changed the flow of money from Rugovo’s party to the KLA. After the Dayton 
Agreement, many diaspora communities believed that the KLA’s armed insurgency 
rather than Rugova’s peaceful resistance movement was a feasible option to achieve 
Kosovar secession from Serbia. Furthermore, the crisis in Albania increased the military 
power of KLA members by enabling them to procure large numbers of weapons and 
military equipment very cheaply. The KLA’s gaining power and influence in the 
homeland increased its popularity among the outside Albanian population, which 
aggrandized its share of the remittances. 141 
3. Neighborhood Effects 
The implications of the Dayton Accord, the crisis in neighboring Albania, and the 
Milosevic regime’s weak position in domestic and international affairs accelerated the 
transformation of Rugova’s peaceful protest movement into rebellion against the Serbian 
state. To begin with, Kosovar Albanians’ expectations of independence from Serbian rule 
increased with Bosnia and Herzogovina’s secession from Yugoslavia under the terms of 
Dayton Accord. Next, the chaos in Albania of 1999 enabled the KLA to provide 
weapons, ammunitions and military equipment from neighboring Albania to use against 
the central authority.142 Next, the Milosevic regime was politically, economically, and 
psychologically weakened, due to secessionist movements throughout the old 
Yugoslavian state, and costly war with Croatia and Bosnia. The atrocities they committed 
in the Bosnian War put them in a very weak position in the international community. 
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Despite their determination to keep remaining territories united, there was a big pressure 
on the international community to intervene against Serbian brutality when the fighting 
was intensified.143 
D. CHALLENGES FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
UNMIK and KFOR took over the responsibility for stabilization and 
reconstruction of post-conflict Kosovo with the enactment of UN Security Council 1244 
of June 10, 1999. The resolution replaced Serbian security and administrative authorities 
with the international officials who authorized the presence of a NATO-led peace-
keeping force and UN interim administration.144   
The international community had a hard task for Kosovo’s reconstruction since it 
had to deal with not only post-conflict transition but also post-socialist and post-secession 
transitions. The international community had several economic challenges to cope with 
when they assumed the responsibility of the economic reconstruction of Kosovo: the 
devastation of war and a fragile environment, the transition to a market economy, and 
elimination of informal economies were some of the most important ones.145 
1. The Devastation of War, Volatile Security Environment and Political 
Uncertainty 
The devastation of war, a volatile security environment and political uncertainty 
were the first major obstacles for post-conflict economic recovery efforts with their 
negative effects on direct investments and entrepreneurship activities.  
First, the civil war and NATO’s subsequent air bombardment devastated the 
country and made a crippled economic situation worse. Infrastructure was badly 
damaged, houses were destroyed, burned, or looted, and agriculture almost stopped 
because of the displacement of the population and large scale use of land mines.146  
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Second, the volatile security environment frustrated economic reconstruction and 
development efforts since establishing a safe and secure environment was UNMIK’s 
primary focus. The risk of retributive violence was very high, since withdrawing Serbian 
forces and KLA militants were both seeking revenge. Although the deployment of KFOR 
and UNMIK’s taking responsibility of administration in the country enabled almost one 
million Kosovar Albanians to return to their homes, their presence could not prevent 
Serbian minorities from displacing to Serbia or to Serbian enclaves within the boundaries 
of Kosovo, with the fear of retribution from returning Albanian population. 147  
Third, the undetermined status of the country hindered investments and 
entrepreneurship activities in the region for years. Due to its inability to borrow money, 
Kosovo depended on foreign assistance from donor countries and organizations to 
finance its nascent economy. Although the new country benefited from some projects, 
such as the “quick impact trust fund” to meet the basic needs of local communities, 
political uncertainty frustrated self-financing programs aimed at sustaining economic 
development.148 
2. Transition to Market Economy 
Before the war, the Kosovar economy was a small part of the Yugoslavian 
economic structure. Most of the economic activities in the region were centrally planned 
and administered by political and financial authorities in Belgrade. The economy 
depended on state-owned enterprises that ceased to run with the beginning of the 
conflicts, and the economic infrastructure was very weak. National decision makers, as 
well as the population, were unfamiliar with the free-market economy. The transition 
process to a peace-time economy in a free-market model should be supported by new 
legal regulatory frameworks and institutions. Especially, the laws should address the 
complex problems of property rights.149  
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Furthermore, the removal of experienced Serbians from industries caused a 
shortage of skilled personnel to assist the UNMIK in running economic activities. 
Although, Kosovar Albanians were removed from administrative duties for decades in 
the Milosevic regime, these inexperienced personnel were the only human capital that 
could be used to jump-start the economy.150 
3. Property Rights 
Property rights issue were another big challenge for the international community 
in the initial years of reconstruction. UNMIK regulated residential and commercial 
property rights, but structuring state-owned enterprises and trying to privatize them was 
not easy because of political ambiguity. For example, UNMIK tried to re-operate the 
Trepca Mining and Metallurgical Complex with the help of foreign investments. This 
initiative would provide about 2000 jobs for locals, but both Serbian and Albanian people 
prevent it with their protests. Privatization meant to them the exploitation of their 
valuable resources by foreigners. Disregarding complicated problems of property rights 
had negative impacts on long-term investment policies, and created pessimism about 
economic recovery.151  
4. Informal Economies 
Civil war created new political and economic actors who wanted to maintain their 
wealth and power after NATO’s intervention. Before and during the conflict, KLA 
captured almost all the economic activities of the region. They established their own 
political and financial power. They do not want to lose their benefits in the post-conflict 
environment.152 
Decades of poverty and socio-economic discrimination of Belgrade’s regime 
impelled Kosovar Albanians to seek alternative sources for economic survival. The 
discriminative legislations in 1990s caused almost 145.000 ethnic Albanians to lose their 
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jobs. The youth unemployment rate reached 70 percent in 1995. Diaspora remittances 
enabled most of families to subsist but many people were involved in informal economic 
activities to meet basic needs. Furthermore, Rugovo’s parallel government was reliant on 
the revenues obtained from informal economies. KLA’s increased power in the country 
also intensified informal economic activities in the region.153   
The presence of KFOR and UNMIK did not stop the illegal activities of criminal 
economic organization that dramatically decrease the revenues from taxation. Informal 
economies became more widespread after the withdrawal of Yugoslavian military and 
police force. According to UNMIK report in 2001, the interim administration was not 
able to collect half of the potential tax revenues, due to the activities of informal or 
criminal organizations. Soon after the departure of Serbian authorities, the KLA captured 
important economic assets, such as real estate, hotels, and petrol stations. These 
economic resources not only provided a large amount of money for KLA to become a 
political power, but they were also used for money laundering operations. 154 
The parallel political structures of both Serbian and Albanian sides also 
challenged the rule of central authority through taxation of economic activities in their 
regions. The local elites benefited from power vacuum for the purpose of self-enrichment 
and gaining political influence. The illegal taxation, extortion and criminal economies 
became a part of post-conflict economic environment. UNMIK’s and KFOR’s inability to 
stop these illegal activities weakened their credibility among population.155 
5. Coordinating Post-Conflict Reconstruction Efforts 
Coordinating and integrating efforts of many organizations which have different 
structures, priorities and budgets posed many challenges to UNMIK, especially at the 
early phases of the reconstruction process. As mandated by UNSCR 1244, UN assumed 
the leadership role in harmonizing the efforts of organizations like; NATO, EU,OSCE 
and many agencies within UN such as UNHCR. Each organization took the responsibility 
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of specific duties for Kosovo’s civil and economic reconstruction. EU assumed the 
leadership for economic reconstruction and development, UNHCR was assigned for 
humanitarian issues, and OSCE was focused on democratization process.156  UNMIK 
neither had designed economic recovery strategy for an integrated operation not it had 
managerial and executive capabilities to implement it. UN unpreparedness in establishing 
a cooperative mechanism among these essentially different institutions, and setting 
priorities in an integrated way to achieve common goal of reconstruction scaled down the 
economic recovery achievements.157  
E. POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECOVERY EFFORTS 
1. International Priorities 
The European Union assumed the responsibility of the economic reconstruction 
task. To coordinate international assistance and development activities, it cooperated with 
the World Bank, the United States and other international donors. The international 
community’s efforts were strong and unprecedented which mainly accounted for some 
achievements in the region.158 For example, EU-World Bank report in 2000 estimated 
that at least $2.3 billion was needed for the reconstruction job till to the 2004. The 
international community provided about 3 billion dollars to this assessment. However, 
international community was not successful enough to differentiate between economic 
reconstruction and development. They acknowledged the importance of supporting small 
businesses, but they could not endorse the necessary reforms to build economic 
institutions. The role of economic development was not in the international community’s 
planning and first priorities; the main focus was on economic reconstruction.159  
The reconstruction of Kosovo’s economy were needed in the initial stages of the 
post-conflict recovery mission for good image and for preventing social unrest, but 
prolonging the same policies did not yield sustainable economic development. On the 
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other hand, economic development focuses more on entrepreneural activities, which 
would help in establishing new firms, creating jobs for people and eventually achieving 
sustainable growth in the long run.160  
2. Post-Conflict Economic Recovery Policies 
International efforts were quick and successful in providing security and 
humanitarian assistance to war-torn Kosovo. Most of the Kosovar Albanian refugees and 
IDPs returned their homes within the first month of the intervention as a result of 
KFOR’s ability to minimize security threats. UNMIK was quite successful in meeting the 
basic needs of food assistance to almost 900, 000 persons, and emergency shelter for 
thousands of people during the intervention year.161   
Being the main responsible organization for economic reconstruction the EU 
started to institution building efforts soon after emergency humanitarian relief tasks were 
done. A Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) was established to regulate import tariffs, and to 
determine tax policies and budget formulation. The authority assumed the responsibility 
of finance ministry until the real ministry was formed.162 Financial transactions were put 
in a regulatory framework with the creation of Banking and Payments Authority of 
Kosovo (BPAK). BPAK not only supervised local financial institutions as a central bank, 
but also organized the payment system.163 The complicated old trade regime was 
substituted with the simple 10 percent tariff rate system. Additionally, foreign currencies 
were accepted in domestic transactions that facilitated tax collection.164 
The international community found a surprisingly dynamic small business 
environment in Kosovo which assisted the progress of economic reconstruction and 
development. Yugoslavia’s central authorities had full control of economic activities in 
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the economic recession in 1980s and 1990s, prompted many people to create their own 
small businesses which were mostly created by the financial assistance of diaspora in 
Europe. Badly affected by the war, these small businesses were supported with the 
establishment of the Kosovo Micro Enterprise Bank (MEB Kosovo) in 1999. Besides 
providing banking services, the bank gave loans to between 18,000 and 20,000 
microenterprises and small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs ). Legalizing informal 
economies was relatively successful in comparison to privatization efforts. Controlling 
illicit economic activities provided a good amount of money for the government.165 
However, the international community’s interest and generosity began to decline after 
three years of involvement, mostly due to uncertainties about Kosovo’s final status. 
Long-term economic development strategies were replaced by short-term political 
decisions.166 Because of the decline in foreign assistance, the investment rate was 
diminished from 40 percent of the GDP level to 31 percent of the GDP in the period of 
2001–2006.167 
Kosovo’s undetermined final status had negative impacts on many economic 
issues, such as property rights, foreign direct investments, and unemployment. 
Macroeconomic policies could not be implemented successfully, and Kosovo was 
deprived of the economic advantages of being a member of an international organization. 
The inability to cope with these challenges made Kosovar economy largely reliant on 
donor countries’ financing aid and diaspora remittances. 168  
The unilateral declaration of independence gave positive incentives to foreign 
investments and employment creation by increasing the predictability of the economy, 
and put property rights into a legal and regulatory framework to some extent, but Serbia’s 
refusal to recognize the secession of Kosovo, as well as Russia’s strong support for 
Serbia, and many other countries’ abstention, prevented an economic boom which was 
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expected to happen right after the declaration of independence.169 The economic 
performance of the country had been poor for years. As Figure 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate; 
unemployment and GDP rates remained unchanged. Revenues did not increase much.170  
 
 
Figure 5.   Kosovo, revenue (% of GDP) between years 2002–11. 
 
Figure 6.   Kosovo, unemployment rate (in %) between 2003–10. 
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Figure 7.   Kosovo, GDP% Growth between years 2002–11. 
In sum, the international community failed to differentiate between economic 
reconstruction and economic development. “Helping the poorest of the poor”171 hindered 
the development of local markets. Although more than ten years have passed since 
intervention, providing people humanitarian aid, food, and other basic needs is still the 
issue in Kosovo. Humanitarian assistance for a protracted period of time undermines 
local farmers and merchants and undercuts efficient markets. Kosovo has actually needed 
entrepreneurs. Building roads, bridges, water irrigation, and telecommunication systems 
does not lead to sustainable growth.172 Efforts to reconstruct infrastructure were not 
enough alone to jumpstart the economy. As Schramm says “dynamism of new firms 
constantly introducing innovations into the economy” is the absolute solution for 
Kosovo’s economic problems.173 
3. Prospectus for Economic Development 
a. Positive 
Kosovo has a good rate of human and financial capital for achieving 
sustainable economic development. Given that these two factors are very important for 
achieving a growth-oriented economy, persistent economic development can be realized 
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with the guidance of international organizations, like the IMF and World Bank. However, 
the country has to overcome major obstacles to utilize its human and financial capital 
with full efficiency.  
(1) Human capital: Although the quality of human capital needs to 
be improved, high literacy rates and a considerable youth population create optimism. On 
the other hand, the large Kosovar diaspora can contribute with their experience and 
efficiency if they could be attracted to come back to their country of origin. The capital 
they accumulated abroad, with the right incentives, can transform small businesses, 
which could help jumpstart the economy.174  
Financial capital:  Kosovo could grow its financial sector 
successfully. There are six commercial banks, nine insurance companies and fifteen 
micro-financing institutions operating in the country, under the supervision of the Central 
Banking Authority (CBAK).175 The international community is generous towards 
Kosovo; if European countries recover from recession it may provide more money to 
increase financial capital. These aids can hinder economic growth unless they are 
managed well. International guidance is needed in this regard.  
The focus of these efforts should be the implementation of right 
incentives and measures to encourage entrepreneurship, market forces, and indigenous 
businesses. Developing large, labor intense manufacturing industries such as textiles, 
clothing, and footwear in a country like Kosovo can absorb vast numbers of workers who 
might otherwise be unemployed and subject to ethnic tensions and underground 
networks.176 
b. Obstacles for Economic Recovery in Kosovo 
(1) Political Ambiguity: Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence did not resolve its political and economic problems. Although it is 
recognized by 89 states throughout the world, Russia and China in UN Security Council, 
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and Spain, Greece, Romania and Slovakia in the European Union opposed its 
independence. Moreover, Serbia still considers Kosovo a UN-administered region within 
the Serbian country. The uncertainty about the future of northern Kosovo, which is 
mostly populated by Kosovar Serbians, is another challenge for the social integration of 
Kosovar society. Political limbo remains the biggest challenge for economic development 
with its negative effects on investment.177 
(2) Diaspora remittances: One fifth of the Kosovar population has 
a family member working outside the country to send money for support. Remittances 
constitute a large portion of Kosovo’s revenues. With regard to economic development, 
diaspora remittances have both negative and positive effects. On the one hand, they 
eliminate incentives for economic growth in society by discouraging people`s 
determination to work and gain more money; on the other hand, they have rescued people 
from falling into poverty and extreme poverty levels. The remittances also contribute 
economic growth, if people can be persuaded to share out some portion of the money on 
savings and investment.178  
(3) Infrastructure: Despite the international community’s strong 
effort towards recovering the infrastructure of the country, there are many infrastructural 
problems, like; electricity and the road system.  
One of the major impediments to Kosovo’s economic growth and 
development is inadequate and unreliable electricity. The Kosovo Energy Corporation 
(KEK) is not able to meet the demand for total electricity use both for industrial and 
household purposes. Power outages disrupt manufacturing, education and health services. 
As the population grows, demand for energy is also increasing. 179 
Most of the roads are in bad condition in the country. Only 28 
percent of the road system is considered to be in good condition. In the rail road system, 
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333 km of track is inactive due to electricity problems. The abysmal shape of the road 
system is another crippling factor for the economy, discouraging entrepreneurs and 
foreign investors as well.180 
F. RISK OF REVERT TO VIOLENCE 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence did not resolve its political and 
economic problems. The IC’s initial strong efforts diminished in time. Management of 
the economy lacks coherence and a proper strategy. Political uncertainty, a low degree of 
foreign investment, a high unemployment rate, slow growth, and poverty are major 
factors hampering sustainable economic development. Economic risk factors are still 
relevant motivations for Kosovo to return to violence. Given that hostilities among 
different ethnic communities could not be reconciled, the risk of conflict should not be 
discounted in the region.181  
  Today, Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe. Twenty percent of the 
population is from 15–24 years old. Youth unemployment rate is estimated at more than 
75 percent, which is five times higher than the average within the European Union.182 It 
has been estimated that roughly 200,000 young men and women will reach working age 
in the next five years, while the number of people reaching retirement age will be 
approximately 60,000. Demographic figures calls for an urgent need for economic 
improvement to reach sustainable peace.183   
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V. CONCLUSION 
The literature on the causes of civil conflicts has long discussed the effects of 
greed and grievances on their outbreak. The thesis values the importance of both factors 
and their roles on stirring dissension in different circumstances. However, certain 
economic characteristics of a given country and insurgent groups’ opportunities to sustain 
their rebellion activities there certainly require incorporating economic perspectives in 
the analysis of civil conflicts. Therefore, civil conflict analysis of any region should 
include economic perspectives. Engaging the political economy of civil wars requires at 
least defining the economic risk factors that cause civil conflicts, understanding the social 
and political aspects of war economies, and creating effective policy responses to post-
conflict economic challenges.  
First, defining important economic risk factors and presenting ways to eliminate 
them by examining past experiences may give valuable insights to domestic and 
international decision makers preventing civil wars. Many researches show that important  
risk factors, such as the existence of valuable natural resources184, the poor economic 
performance of governments185 and the availability of diaspora funding186 pose great risk 
that countries will experience civil conflicts. Rebel groups’ ability to sustain their 
activities significantly depends on the economic circumstances of a given country. 
Analyzing these risk factors is salient only if both national and international policy 
makers take them into consideration, evaluate their importance in the decision-making 
processes, and take preventive measures to prevent their reaching a dangerous level that 
may pose a threat to peace. 
Second, understanding the social and political aspects of economic activities in 
wartime is crucial to implementing proper policies for a smooth transformation to peace-
time conditions without creating opportunities for insurgent groups to recruit new rebels. 
Economic activity never stops, even in most severe war times. A war economy contains 
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all economic activities performed in wartime conditions. Transforming war economies 
into peacetime conditions is hard and takes a long time. War economies can be divided 
into three types: combat, shadow and coping economies. These interlinked economies 
involve different actors with dissimilar motivations using different mediums to 
implement their economic activities. In addition to predatory and profit-seeking concerns, 
coping and survival are the other considerations that should be taken into account when 
dealing with war economies.187  
Third, the economic challenges of an unstable post-conflict environment should 
be overcome as soon as possible in order to persuade rebels to give up their activities. 
Peace-makers usually tend to focus on political and military issues in the initial stages of 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions, but experience shows that 
achieving durable peace is more dependent on the economic recovery of a given 
country.188  A fragile economic environment, shadow economy and peace spoilers are the 
three most important challenges that policy-makers have to deal with. It is not easy to 
offer an effective guideline to any given country, since the distinct economic 
characteristics of different countries entail dissimilar solutions. Nonetheless, establishing 
global control regimes for specific goods to curb insurgents’ revenues,189 building robust 
economic institutions to overcome shadow economies, 190 and alleviating socio-
economic problems by providing economic opportunities to population191 are proven 
fundamental responses to cope with these challenges. 
To sum up, this thesis claims that economic dimensions should be brought into 
consideration in a much broader sense when interpreting civil conflicts. Many studies on 
civil conflicts demonstrate that the risk of civil war, its continuity, and its termination are 
strongly correlated with economic variables rather than social elements. Contrary to 
general belief, inequality, an absence of liberal democratic norms and values, and ethnic 
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and religious disparities do not seem to have a significant impact on the risk of civil 
conflict. Therefore, any civil conflict analysis should emphasize economic content.192 
Defining the economic risk factors for preventing conflicts, understanding war economies 
for better evaluating socio-economic realities and attaining valuable results in the peace 
processes, and creating policy responses to cope with post-conflict economic challenges 
are three vital aspects in the economic reconstruction of a war-torn country. In many 
post-conflict settings, the ability to manage these challenges largely determines the 
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